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Logo Muzeum Pamięci Sybiru w Białymstoku
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30.07.1941 – The Sikorski-Mayski Agreement – a document that gave freedom

30/07/1941

Signing of the Sikorski-Mayski Agreement. London, 30 VIII 1941. From left: Władysław Sikorski, Anthony Eden, Winston Churchill and Ivan Mayski. Wikimedia Commons

“As I was about to sign this deal and was struggling with myself whether to wait any longer, I heard, as it were, the whisper of thousands of mouths: Hurry, save us!”, wrote Commander-in-Chief General Władysław Sikorski to General Marian Kukiel. On 30 July 1941, the Polish Government and the Government of the USSR signed the so-called Sikorski-Mayski agreement. The document – approved in London – still evokes extreme emotions. Its supporters point out that, thanks to the decision of General Sikorski, who sat down personally at the negotiating table with Soviet ambassador Ivan Mayski, “freedom” was regained by thousands of deported Poles and those imprisoned in gulag camps. In addition, the document gave rise to Anders’ Army, which contributed significantly to the  victory over Nazi Germany. The very first clause of the document states that the 1939 Soviet-German treaties on the partition of Poland were no longer in force, yet its opponents make it clear that General Sikorski lacked the negotiating skills to insert a provision in the treaty to maintain the pre-war borders. The fact that general Sikorski personally had negotiated with the Soviet diplomat (which was probably due to the Prime Minister’s ambitions) was received with suspicion. Also, the General was criticised for conducting the British-initiated talks too quickly: the deal was signed less than 40 days after British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden’s first phone call to the Kremlin. The Polish authorities’ attitude to the treaty permanently divided them. Historians also differ in their assessment of it to this day. But one must agree with the eminent expert on Polish-Soviet relations of the time, Prof. Wojciech Materski, who believes that more skillful handling of the negotiations by General Sikorski could probably have limited the political losses, but even a different form of the agreement would not have significantly affected the further course of the Polish issue and the post-war fate of the state. All in all, the fact that the lives of tens of thousands of Polish prisoners of Siberia were saved thanks to the agreement cannot be denied by anyone.

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