The Second Polish War

By 1810 Franc’s political and military position in Europe was unassailable. The only blemish on this imperial panorama was the ongoing war with Great Britain, for both sides the most critical theatre of operations at the time being the Iberian Peninsula. However, French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte believed the only way to defeat the British was through the imposition of a complete commercial blockade of the British Isles. The blockade, set in motion in 1806, had failed to break British resistance—even after Russia joined it. Naturally, participants in the blockade had not done so of their own free will, but had been forced into it under the threat of war from France. Among those apparently least satisfied with this arrangement was Tsar Alexander I, whose position in Europe was weaker than Napoleon’s. In 1810 the Russians broke off from the Continental blockade, even initiating the preparation of plans for an anti-French offensive. Napoleon, convinced of the need to strengthen the blockade, had little intention of waiting it out. On 24 June 1812 a 600,000-strong international army under the Emperor’s command crossed the Niemen River and marched eastwards. Two days earlier, when addressing his troops, Napoleon had proclaimed:

Soldiers,

The Second Polish War has begun. The first one ended at Friedland and Tilsit. At Tilsit Russia swore to an eternal alliance with France and war against England. Today she has violated her oaths, offering up no explanation for her strange behaviour, so the French eagles, depending on the discretion of our allies, have been forced to cross the Rhine.

Russia defies her fate; her destiny must be fulfilled. What does she take us for, degenerates? Are we not more like soldiers of Austerlitz? She has forced us into a position between disgrace and war: the choice should not leave a shred of doubt—let us march then – forward!

We have crossed the Niemen, bringing the war onto her territory. The Second Polish War, like the first, will bring glory to the French army. The peace treaty that we shall sign will guarantee the end of the arrogant influence Russia has exerted on the course of European affairs for the past fifty years.

It is therefore no surprise that among the troops advancing from East Prussia and the Duchy of Warsaw into Russia were counted as many as 90,000 Poles—quite remarkable considering that the total population of the Duchy was only around 4.3 million. Polish units would prove to be the most durable and loyal to Napoleon, remaining at his side until the very end. But first, let us return to the early days of the war…

To Moscow, my friend!

Napoleon’s initial move led to the capitulation of Vilnius. In these early days and weeks of the campaign, Russian commanders were unable to agree among themselves on strategy or tactics: should they engage in a decisive pitched battle with the Napoleonic forces, or rather delay the French advance with the aim of wearing them down by utilizing the so-called “scorched-earth” method? In the end, they opted for the latter. It was devised by Marshal Mikhail Barclay de Tolly and implemented by his successor as commander of the Russian army, Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov.

Meanwhile the Grande Armée continued its eastward push. By the close of July it had taken hold of Vitebsk, three weeks later adding Smolensk. The last stop before Moscow was Borodino, where a massive battle between the two sides finally broke out. Approximately 250,000 soldiers faced one another, of whom a total of about 80,000 were killed. The French emerged victorious, but it was not exactly the kind of victory they had been hoping for. One of their main objectives had been the total annihilation of the Russian Army. Instead, the defeated Russian forces were able to make a retreat from the battlefield. Napoleon, was reluctant to commit his elite Guard to the fight, fearful of potential losses—he thereby forfeited his chance to completely annihilate the enemy. Nevertheless, the road to Moscow did now lay open.

All is darkness, all is quiet…

On 14 September 1812, after barely three months of campaigning, Napoleon entered Moscow
(by way of comparison: in 1941 the Wehrmacht reached the outskirts of Moscow after only about five months of fighting).
But what kind of “Moscow” was it?

The Russians had abandoned the city without resistance. Along with the army, all inhabitants and—worse still—all food supplies had been evacuated. From Napoleon’s point of view it must have looked disastrous, right? But that was not the end of it. On 14 September fires began to rage all over Moscow—widespread, large-scale and fast-spreading. Who might have been behind them? There are competing theories. One claims it was the work of Russian troops who, retreating eastward, took the “scorched earth” policy very much to heart. Another theory points the finger at Russian saboteurs. Yet another attributes the fires to French troops who, upon entering the city, began looting and destroying it. Whatever the cause—or combination of causes—the fires caused endless difficulties for Napoleon’s stay in Moscow. All the more so because the onset of autumn in Russia and autumn in France are two strikingly different worlds. The harsh atmospheric conditions spared no time in exacting their toll on the French troops— and the worst was still to come. Napoleon had hoped for a Russian capitulation, but the proposals sent to the Tsar met with a stony silence.

After just over a month, on 18 October 1812, Napoleon ordered a retreat towards Smolensk. The Grande Armée marched out of Moscow heading westwards…
Winter, Cossacks, partisans—the Grande Armée would soon practically cease to exist.

A success—or not quite?

In many popular-history publications one meets with the opinion that Napoleon’s capture of Moscow amounted to a success for his army. But was it really?

Did Napoleon in fact “capture” Moscow? His troops simply marched into it—without a fight. True, it ought to be remembered that the Battle of Borodino – a victory that came with heavy casualties –  did in fact open up the road to Moscow. The city itself, however, was not defended.

Secondly, Napoleon’s march on Moscow is frequently compared to its seizure by the forces of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1610 or to the fighting that took place in 1941. However, both of those situations were radically different to the one Napoleon found himself in. Why?
Because in both 1610 and 1941 Moscow served as the capital of Russia/the Soviet Union. In 1812, however, St Petersburg was the capital (with Moscow still regarded as the historical home of the tsars).

And one final issue—the length of the stay in Moscow. A month does not appear to be very long; it is rather a temporary encampment. On the other hand, Napoleon ordered the retreat without his hand being forced by military necessities —that is, he was not forced out by the operations of Russian armed forces. Who knows what may have happened had he decided to camp down for the winter in the occupied city? A month’s stay not seem to be a long time, but it is worth noting, it was a period determined entirely by the Emperor’s own decision.

Yet 1812 clearly demonstrated that true Russian defensive strength lay not solely in its army. Above all, it was down to a combination of the climate and sheer vastness of the territory.